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ABSTRACT
Background/Objectives: State Health Officials (SHOs), the physician-leaders of state public health
departments in the US, have long been indicated as potential peacemakers between the fields of medicine
and public health.1 However, the average term length of SHOs has declined in recent years. Meanwhile,
the COVID-19 pandemic has increased public visibility of state public health departments and their
leadership. Some have hypothesized that the political strain of the pandemic has further accelerated SHO
turnover, compromising their leadership efficacy.2 Contrarily, others have suggested that the pandemic
would force public health and organized medicine into closer collaborative alignment through a common
enemy.1 To weigh these claims, this study aims to (1) evaluate the self-reported impact of “derailing
factors” that contribute to SHO job turnover and unsuccessfulness, highlighting any factors that the
pandemic might have exacerbated and (2) examine the impact of COVID-19 on formal collaborative
efforts between medicine and public health, using SHOs and state medical society executives (SMEs) as
surrogates for these groups.
Methods: Between August 1 and December 23, 2021, original cross-sectional survey feedback was
requested from the entire population of current SHOs (N=51) and SHO alumni that left office between
January 1 and June 30, 2020 (N=50). SHOs’ relative perceived importance of “derailing factors” during
their tenure were compared to the relative frequency of derailers reported by area experts prior to the
pandemic.3 Post-pandemic frequencies of formal collaborative activities between SHOs and SMEs were
also collected and compared to pre-pandemic frequencies on the same activities.1 Free responses about
communication between SHOs, SMEs, and other stakeholders was thematically post-coded.
Findings: The average reported tenures for current SHOs (n=19) and SHO alumni (n=8) were not
significantly different: 2.26 y (SD=2.47) and 2.75 y (SD=2.19), respectively (p>0.05). These tenures were
consistent with the published tenure for current SHOs in 20174 (2.8 y, SD 2.1). The relative ranked
importance of eight accepted derailers among SHOs did shift compared to pre-pandemic estimates;
publicity crises, political disinformation, and voluntary staff turnover increased in relative significance
between 2017 and 2021. SHOs in office 3 years or less were more likely to rank voluntary staff turnover
as significantly problematic (p=0.049).
Overall, respondents reported a decline in the presence of a state health department board or advisory
committee between 2019 and 2021 (76.9% in 2019 à 33.3% in 2021; p<0.001), as well as a decline in
state medical society representation on that board (46.2% in 2019 à 14.8% in 2021; p=0.008). Finally,
SHOs reported weekly to monthly communication with SMEs, which was equivalent to SHOs’ frequency
of communication with other key stakeholders. Post-coded topics of communication were also similar
across stakeholder groups, focusing primarily on COVID-19 mitigation and surveillance.
Conclusions: SHOs’ top derailers appear to have shifted from friction with elected superiors to negative
public perception and political disinformation. This is likely secondary to the public’s increased
awareness of SHOs’ role during the pandemic and resultant outsized backlash. Reported decreases in state
public health committees and organized medicine representation therein are concerning given the
nationwide legislative pushback against state health departments’ pandemic powers. Given this study’s
limited sample size, more research is needed to detail the breadth and impact of this change. Otherwise,
most formal collaborative channels between SHOs and SMEs appear unchanged since pre-pandemic
times. Thematic analysis of free response data suggests that the pandemic has encouraged collaboration
and political allyship between SHOs and SMEs on par with SHOs’ other key stakeholder relationships.

KEYWORDS Public Health Departments; Collaboration; Job Turnover; Public Health Leadership;
COVID-19
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INTRODUCTION
The COVID-19 pandemic has dramatically impacted nearly all facets of American civic and
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carry out those functions.7 The authors support the appointment of medical doctors as the heads of state
agencies and simultaneously recommend term length mandates to “promote needed continuity of

private life. Its effects have been felt particularly among those in the field of public health. These

professional leadership.”7 They also frame competence in management as a quality that is equally

individuals, once civil servants and scientists operating under-the-radar, have now been thrust into the

important as technical public health proficiency. Finally, the report places the burden on public health

spotlight and tasked to forecast and contain a public health threat unlike any in their lifetime. The

leaders to coordinate collaborative efforts with physicians, by extension charging SHOs with healing the

implications of this role shift are still evolving. This study aims to take a real-time look at two groups that

rift between organized medicine and public health. In part, this historical delegation of collaborative

are at the center of the pandemic – the heads of public health and organized medicine in all fifty states.

leadership to the state health department is why this capstone focuses on SHOs over SMEs.
In the early 1990s, a working group between the American Medical Association (AMA) and

What follows is a study of what is currently known about state health officials (SHOs) and state medical
society executives (MSEs), their qualifications, turnover, and means of collaboration, and what can be

American Public Health Association (APHA) was convened to carry out the actions suggested in The

done to support and strengthen their professional and collaborative capacity moving forward.

Future of Public Health, called the Medicine and Public Health Initiative (MPHI). Funding for various

History of Collaboration between Organized Medicine and Public Health
To understand the collaborative landscape of organized medicine and public health organizations,
it is important to examine these groups’ shared history in the United States. The initial kinship then early
schism between organized medicine and public health has been well-detailed elsewhere, particularly in
Starr’s The Social Transformation of American Medicine.5 This review will focus on collaborative efforts
from the mid 20th century forward, as outlined by Scutchfield et al.6
In the 1960s, healthcare practitioners identified the need for healthcare that stretched beyond
basic clinical services, giving rise to the community oriented primary care movement (COPCM) and the
creation of community health centers. This local-level intervention focused on bringing multi-disciplinary
teams together to address patients’ full spectrum of socioecological health needs, focusing on the needs of
a community rather than the individual only.6 However, COPCM never caught on at a national scale.
The managed care model arose in the 1980s and 90s. It sought to link the population health
principles of the COPCM with cost savings. This model had isolated success, most notably exemplified
by the Kaiser Permanente health system. However, as Scutchfield et al. point out, managed care
eventually became too focused on cost savings at the expense of equity.6 Pertinent to this capstone are the
authors’ observations that (1) medicine’s interests often dominate public health’s when they are
combined, (2) the professional cultures of each discipline are at odds, and (3) recognition of the prior two
points are necessary to repair interdisciplinary connections and improve collaboration.

projects across 19 states was provided by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation-funded Cooperative
Actions for Health program, which yielded several impressive outcomes. Beitsch et al.8 categorized the
examples of success into improved healthcare service access, better care coordination, greater costeffectiveness/quality, strengthened community health promotion, use of clinical practice to identify
community health problems and – most relevant for this capstone – strengthened collaboration.
Collaborative success stories included the development of a standing steering committee within the
California Medical Association that included local health officials, as well as the Florida Medical
Association’s successful advocacy for the creation of a freestanding Florida Department of Health.8
However, later leaders in the AMA and APHA lost zeal for the MPHI, sidelining it for political agendas
and priorities of their own.6,8 Though promising at its outset, the MPHI eventually stalled, unfunded, like
many programs before it.
In many areas, the directives set forth in The Future of Public Health remain ideas only. For
example, very few states have tenure length requirements for their SHOs, and formal collaborative efforts
remain halting.1 The vision for SHOs as “chief community health strategists” has been superseded by the
political realities of changing leadership and unstable funding. In light of this, Dr. Ronald Davis (the first
preventive medicine physician to become president of the AMA) published a series of specific, attainable
action steps for SHOs and SMEs to improve collaboration on their own terms, apart from reliance on
funded projects.9 His recommendations were abstracted into a series of survey questions that were used to
examine formal collaborative activities in this capstone.

In response to these and many other collaborative ‘failures to launch,’ the Institute of Medicine
published the seminal 1988 report, The Future of Public Health.7 “Too often confrontation and suspicion

Profile of State Health Officials

are evident on both sides” the report opens, highlighting the culture clash between organized medicine

Role

and public health. The authors outline a vision for the core functions of public health agencies –
assessment, policy development, and assurance – and designate state agencies as the “central force” to

SHOs are the appointed leaders of their states’ public health agencies and therefore responsible
for leading and administering all activities under that umbrella. They are also, in most cases, key advisors
for their governors and legislatures regarding evidence-based scientific policy decisions. A report by the
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Public Health Leadership Forum casts a vision for government health departments as “community chief

group. Anecdotally, several former SHOs, deputies, and other public health leaders have confirmed the

health strategists” – making SHOs the ‘head chiefs’ of these influential agencies.10

SHO-governor relationship as a bellwether of success.3,12,16,17
Based on this collection of expert insights, it appears that the most effective SHOs are guides for

Professional Qualifications
Most states require SHOs to be medical doctors, though exact regulations vary from state to state.
Most SHOs are appointed either by a governor, secretary of health, or state board of health.4 According to
2019 data, SHOs in turn report to either governors (27 states), health secretaries/deputy secretaries (20
11

states), or boards of health (3 states). SHOs share knowledge and experience through the Association of

the health services within and beyond their agencies’ purviews. They set priorities and engage
stakeholders in a way that makes health (broadly speaking) more financially viable and equitable for all.
Given the financial strains and inefficiencies inherent in the underfunded public health system, strong
SHOs also use management expertise to optimize their organizations’ efficiency.10

State and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO), which promotes SHO interests and tracks state health

Profile of Medical Society Executives

department activities. Despite ASTHO’s wealth of department-level data, little has historically been

Role

known about SHOs’ professional background and qualifications. In the past some assumed that, because

State medical societies are private agencies responsible for organizing and advocating on behalf

SHOs are political appointees rather than merit-based employees, they lack the public health and

of physicians at a state government level. The societies referenced in this study are general state medical

governmental experience to fully execute their roles.12

societies and associations only – not those that serve specific disciplines or specialties. Given their strong

This perception has recently changed in light of new research. A group supported by the de

emphasis on legislative advocacy on behalf of doctors and patients, state medical societies’ interests often

Beaumont and Robert Wood Johnson foundations published the results of the SHO-CASE study, a

align with those of the state department of public health. As detailed in a recent publication by Scutchfield

massive data collection effort surveying all living SHOs who served from 1973-2017. This study found

et al., 1 the two groups participate in collaborative activities that influence the welfare of their states.

that most SHOs during that period were male (61.2%), white (83.5%) MDs (64.6%).13 Interestingly, the

State medical societies are typically governed by a board of trustees or board of directors

results also showed that 70% of SHOs had prior public health experience; 57% of respondents were

comprised of physician delegates, including an elected president/chair. The societies’ day-to-day

promoted directly out of an antecedent governmental position. In addition, 34.7% had an MPH or PhD in

operations are managed by full-time CEOs and/or executive vice presidents, who are paid staff of the

public health, and 21.8% had a degree in management.13 This paints a picture of a qualified, experienced

medical society. These full-time CEOs are the population of interest in this capstone.

group of leaders.

Qualities of Successful SHOs
Additional research from the SHO-CASE group and others has yielded new insight into the

Professional Qualifications
State medical societies are a looser network of agencies with more varied interests and roles than
state departments of health. Because their existence is not established by state law, gathering information

qualities of successful SHOs – qualities which, from this capstone’s perspective, could be protective

about their leadership and function is more challenging. A personal review of available state MSE profiles

factors against SHO turnover. State public health deputies, typically second-in-command to SHOs, are a

on state medical society websites in February 2022 showed that 59% (30) were male, at least 19% (10)

group of nonpolitical government bureaucrats who may witness the arrival and departure of numerous

were attorneys, and at least 15% (8) held business or healthcare administration degrees or certificates.

SHOs during their careers. Because of this, they have been considered the “keepers of institutional

Another common theme noted among available profiles was that several MSEs had prior experience as

memory” within state health departments.14 Past research has asked these deputies to identifying qualities

policy analysts, lobbyists, or bureaucrats in state government. Many medical society leaders are members

of particularly successful SHOs; their responses centered on credibility, trustworthiness, commitment to

of the American Association of Medical Society Executives, a national analogue to ASTHO. Currently

evidence-based policy, and a focus on strengthening the agency.3

there are no published findings on the demographics or qualities of successful MSEs.

In search of a more formal performance metric, Halverson et al. conducted informal interviews of
SHOs, who identified two common domains of success: (1) effective team building and (2) organizational
accomplishments, the latter including “new or enhanced formal relationships with key partners,” (e.g.
organized medicine).15 Elected officials, particularly governors, were considered a preeminent stakeholder
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SHO Turnover as a Barrier to Success

legislative/gubernatorial opposition to scientific policies.3,23 Of particular interest for this capstone,

Organizational Stability and Turnover Acceleration

Boedigheimer et al. published a list of specific derailment themes derived from the nominal group

Developing the skills that define effective SHOs – namely agency leadership, stakeholder
engagement, and team building – takes time. One former SHO estimated that mastering the basic
requirements of the job takes at least 2 years.12 Business literature on executive tenure referenced in prior

findings among 200 senior health deputies in 2016-2017.3 (That list was adapted with the authors’
permission to create a survey tool for this study.)
Overall, these findings and recommendations illustrate that political conflict is a broad driver of

discussions of SHO tenure approximates the optimal CEO tenure length as 12 years.18,19 As demonstrated

SHO turnover. Given that a SHO’s expected allegiance is to scientific, evidence-based policy rather than

in the SHO-CASE study, SHO tenure length is rarely optimal. In fact, it has become progressively shorter

political agenda, several authors have suggested that governors should prioritize SHO experience over

over the past several decades. The average SHO tenure from 1973 to 2017 was 5.3 years; it dropped to 2.9

politics.4,20 The push for a nonpolitical SHO appointment structure is supported by the finding that,

years between 2010 and 2017. Separate ASTHO data recorded an average of 12.3 new SHOs per year

between 1980 and 2017, SHOs that were board of health appointees had tenures that were roughly twice

from 1980-2017, with 98 SHOs serving for a year or less during that same period.20 By all accounts, the

as long as those of gubernatorial appointees.20

average SHO tenure is far below the expectation for successful executives.

The COVID-19 Pandemic and SHO Turnover

4

Overall, no SHO-CASE respondents felt their tenure was too lengthy. Conversely, 45.2%

Even in the late 2010s, when most available research was published, the job outlook for SHOs

believed their tenure was too short, and over half of the turnovers reported were involuntary.4 Among

was bleak. Then the COVID-19 pandemic abruptly thrust SHOs into the limelight. With SHOs’

those, most were due to a SHO’s proactive acceptance of another position ahead of a state administration

increasingly frequent television appearances and policy recommendations, the public began to realize the

change or in response to the announcement of a different SHO by a new administration.4 A plurality of

integral role that public health departments and their leaders play in civic life. A study comparing partisan

those terminated said their departure had “significant or very large effect on their agency’s ability to

perceptions of public health between September 2018 and July 2020 showed that US citizens’ overall

fulfill its mission.”4 This tenure discontinuity might explain some of the burnout SHOs and other health

familiarity with the role of public health departments rose 11% during that time.24 Perceived importance

department leaders experience.21

of health departments in supporting community health rose as well, with the biggest gains seen among

A final blow to the SHO tenure crisis is the impending retirement of numerous public health
senior deputies and other managers. According to the PH WINS survey in 2017, over a third of state

Republicans (increased from 42% to 62%).24
However, the political discourse over COVID-19 health policies and agents has become

health agency managers and executives indicated they planned to retire by 2023.14 The departure of these

increasingly polarized. According to Kaiser Health News, since the COVID-19 pandemic began, over 300

institutional knowledge-keepers leaves increasingly inexperienced SHOs in a precarious position.

state and local health department leaders have left office.25 This includes 18 state and territorial health

Politics as a Systemic Derailer

officials as of January 2021 by the personal tally of an area expert.2 If these popular estimates are

Given the growing tenure problem, the SHO-CASE group and others have put significant
scholarly effort toward describing the drivers of SHO turnover. Again, establishment of trust with outside

accurate, this exit dwarfs the retirement predictions of the PH WINS survey in 2017.
Meanwhile, burnout is reaching critical levels among public health workers still on the job;

partners and the governor’s office appear to be keys to longer tenure.4 Existing literature focuses heavily

59.2% reported working ≥41 hours per week for the first year of the pandemic.26 This has reaped dire

on the SHO-governor relationship and advises SHOs to develop a proactive strategy for dealing with a

consequences for workers’ mental health; approximately half of respondents to a related survey reported

“hostile political environment.” To enhance the gubernatorial relationship, suggested strategies include

experiencing anxiety, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, or suicidal ideation in the two weeks

avoiding surprises, setting realistic expectations for agency goals, and understanding the governor’s

preceding the survey – a 10-20% higher prevalence than that seen even among healthcare workers.26 The

agenda, priorities, and “hot button” topics. Failing to uphold these responsibilities are among the

reasons for burnout are multiple, but the social pressures of the field cannot be oversold. Twenty-three

commonly cited “early warning signs” for SHO derailment, which also include micromanagement,

percent of public health workers reported bullying, threatening, or harassment because of their work in

constant crises within the agency, and poor situational awareness and control.3,16,22 Likewise, some signs

the first year of the pandemic; 11.8% reported receiving job-related threats.26 Because of SHOs’ public-

outside of the SHO’s control can spell trouble, like lack of budgetary support for activities and

facing role, rates of aggression toward them are likely even higher.

22
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Documented examples of opposition toward SHOs are numerous. As mentioned earlier,
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feedback collected from SHOs and SHO alumni between August and December 2021 will be compared to

resistance within the legislature and executive branch is a warning sign of SHO derailment. In pandemic

prior research on contributors to turnover. These results will be used to make policy recommendations

times, this has taken a more organized bent than usual. Bills have now been proposed in all 50 state

aimed at preventing such rapid SHO turnover in future crises.

governments to curb public health departmental powers, many banning mask and vaccination mandates,

As a secondary objective, this capstone will examine the impact of COVID-19 on formal

giving county commissioners the power to veto public health orders, and even limiting SHOs’ rights to

collaborative efforts between medicine and public health, as modeled on Davis’s 2004 recommendations.9

mandate quarantines and isolation.25 Mello et al. also noted the judicial system’s involvement: the

Specifically, two sets of survey responses from SHOs regarding their collaboration with MSEs, one

Wisconsin Supreme Court censured its state health secretary because of his masking policies, accusing

before and one during the pandemic, will be used to evaluate the hypothesis that the COVID-19 pandemic

him of “tyranny” and “controlling, subjective judgment.”27

has become a uniting enemy for medicine and public health – a “political campaign,” as Davis wrote,

When not statutorily confining state public health agencies, some legislators and governors
resorted to “overrides” and personal attacks on top officials. For example, Florida’s chief COVID-19 data
analyst was fired when her findings conflicted with the conservative governor’s plans to reopen the state;
she now maintains an independent reporting website, claiming that official state data is massaged to fit
the political agenda.28 Other state administrations have reportedly agreed on evidence-based plans for
reopening, only to scrap those plans without public health consultation weeks later.28 Ohio State
Representative Nino Vitale was criticized for demeaning Jewish SHO Dr. Amy Acton as a “globalist” and
“medical dictator”– labels commonly found in anti-Semitic rhetoric.29 This type of behavior represents a
sharp departure from typical norms for professional treatment of state agency leaders.28
The American public has played its own role in this hostility. Mello et al. decry
“misunderstandings of the pandemic, biases in human risk perception, and a general decline in public
civility”27 as particular culprits. State and local health agents have reported personal attacks for upholding
their departments’ policies during the pandemic. Some have found themselves torn between protecting
themselves and their families and simply doing their jobs. One local health director in Michigan reported
being nearly run off the road by a citizen disgruntled about masking.30 Another group in Oklahoma
threatened to publish a community health director’s home address online in public protest.29 Other public
health leaders have hired security and altered their daily behavior to avoid attacks from angry community
members.31 Reports of local harassment became so severe, in fact, that the National Association of City
and County Health Officials wrote Merrick Garland to request expanded protection of health workers by
the national guard.31 There is no doubt that the public rage over COVID-19 control has taken its own toll
on SHOs and other public health workers.

STUDY AIMS
Given the challenges faced by SHOs in their daily practice, the primary objective of this capstone
is to study the self-reported impact of factors cited to contribute to job turnover and unsuccessfulness
among SHOs, evaluating which factors appear to have been exacerbated by the pandemic. Survey

leading the formerly disjointed groups to fight “shoulder to shoulder, for a worthy cause.”1,9
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METHODS

Indirect communication was defined as “communicating agency needs/perspectives to a cabinet member,

Population & Response Rate

gubernatorial assistant, special appointee, or similar liaison, who then shares those needs/perspectives

This cross-sectional, descriptive study used a survey instrument distributed to the entire
population of current state health officials as of June 2021 (N=51), as well as any SHO alumni who left
office between January 2019 and June 30 2021 (N=50). Using contact information provided by ASTHO,
both paper and email surveys were mailed on three separate occasions between August and December
2021 to current SHOs. Three times during the same period, a separate email invitation was sent by an
ASTHO representative inviting eligible SHO alumni to participate. (Personal mailing addresses were not
shared by ASTHO out of respect for alumni privacy). A cover letter was included with each invitation,
describing risks, benefits, and confidentiality measures of the study. A courtesy reminder call was placed
to the offices of all current SHOs who had not responded near the end of data collection.
Data collection ended on December 23, 2021. Nineteen unique SHO responses and eight unique
SHO alumni responses were collected, representing 37% and 16% response rates, respectively, and a 27%
overall response rate. Management of duplicate responses is described in the section titled “Data
Cleanup.”

with the governor on your behalf.” If communication was indirect, respondents were asked to list the title
of their intermediary.
Section 3 of the survey was adapted directly from Scutchfield et al’s 2019 survey on formal
collaborative activities between SHOs and SMEs.1 Respondents were asked to read a series of statements
and select all that were true in their state. A space for comments was provided.
Section 4 asked SHOs to evaluate the frequency and content of their communication with their
state’s medical society executive or CEO since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic (defined as January
31, 2020 in this case). They were asked to select the frequency of direct communication with the SME
(defined as above) and compare it to their frequency of communication prior to the pandemic. Finally,
respondents were given the opportunity to list their top three topics of communication with the SME since
January 31, 2020 and, if applicable, list any projects, initiatives, or other deliverables these
communications had yielded.
Section 5 asked respondents to list up to three of the most important other nongovernmental
organizations or stakeholders with whom they communicated in their most recent year of service. Then

Survey Instrument
Data was collected using a 5-section survey that was functionally identical for SHO and SHO
alumni; wording was adjusted slightly depending on whether the respondent was currently serving as
SHO (e.g. “are you…?” vs. “were you…?”). The instrument was evaluated by at least four reviewers
familiar with the field and edits were made for clarity and consistency prior to distribution. A full copy of
the current SHO survey is available in Appendix A. The proposal for the study was presented to the
University of Kentucky Institutional Review Board and designated as non-human subject research.
Section 1 of the survey asked participants to list their state, estimate their total length of tenure
including multiple terms, select their appointing entity, and indicate state cabinet membership.
Section 2 was adapted with permission from Boedigheimer et. al’s SHO derailers, with
adaptations described in Appendix A.3 Respondents were asked to evaluate whether the listed

they were asked to estimate their frequency of communication with these groups and to list up to three of
their most common topics of communication.

Data Collection and Storage
Study data were collected and managed using REDCap electronic data capture tools hosted at the
University of Kentucky.32,33 REDCap (Research Electronic Data Capture) is a secure, web-based software
platform designed to support data capture for research studies. A research assistant entered paper
responses into REDCap and removed state and personal identifiers from free response data. Results of
analysis were stored on an encrypted, password-protected computer.

Data Cleanup
The primary data analyst dissociated state identifiers from records prior to data analysis to

circumstances interfered with their ability to carry out their duties in their most recent year of service

preserve respondent anonymity. Responses were coded into geographic regions according to ASTHO’s

using options “not at all,” “a little,” “somewhat,” and “to a great degree.” Respondents had space to

regional groupings to allow comparison to the data collected in 2019. If multiple SHO or SHO alumni

comment and were prompted to list other circumstances not included in the table that interfered with their

responses were received from the same state, the most complete response from each respondent group

success in their past/most recent year of service.

was chosen. If all responses from a given group were equally complete, online responses were chosen

Section 2’s final question asked SHOs to define their primary route of communication with the
governor (direct or indirect). Direct communication was defined on the survey as “personally
communicating agency needs/perspectives to the governor through meetings, phone calls, emails, etc.”

over mailed responses as the researchers had greater confidence that those responses were completed by
the desired recipients. Three duplicate responses were discarded using this strategy. One response was
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discarded because only the introductory information page was completed. Comments and free responses
from all surveys, duplicates or not, were retained for post-coding.

Data Analysis
This is a cross-sectional, descriptive study. All quantitative variables were categorical or ordinal
in nature. Data analysis was completed using IBM SPSS Statistics version 27.0.34 Responses from
Scutchfield et al.’s 2019 survey of SHOs were the control group for sections 1 and 3. Boedigheimer et
al.’s relative frequencies of SHO derailment factors were the control for section 2.3

Section 1: Demographics
For section 1, frequencies were generated for ASTHO region, appointer type, tenure length, and
cabinet membership. ASTHO region response frequency was compared to Scutchfield et al.’s 2019
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Finally, descriptive statistics for SHO-Governor communication frequency and route (“direct,”
“indirect,” or “other”) were calculated. One “other” response was discarded because the respondent said
they participated in both direct and indirect communication in the comments. The remaining “other”
responses were reassigned as either direct or indirect communication by 2-reviewer consensus.

Section 3: SHO-SME Formal Collaboration
Descriptive statistics for each item in this section were generated. Post-pandemic responses from
2021 were compared to pre-pandemic 2019 controls1 using chi-square. Free response comments on this
section were post-coded using the independent two-reviewer post coding strategy as above.

Sections 4 & 5: Communication between SHOs, SMEs, and Other Stakeholders
Descriptive statistics were calculated for SHO communication frequency with SMEs (section 4)

dataset using chi-square. Mean tenure length and standard deviation for 2021 SHO and SHO alumni

and other important organizations (section 5). Communication content for each group was post-coded by

groups was estimated by using the lower limits of possible number of years served based on the ordinal

two independent reviewers, as were the deliverables from SHO-SME communication in section 4 and the

multiple-choice ranges. These means were compared to published mean tenure lengths for SHOs and

types of organizations listed as “most important” in section 5. Differences in post-coding were resolved

SHO alumni from the SHO-CASE study.4 Term lengths between SHO and SHO alumni within the new

by consensus. The raw frequencies of responses within each post-coded category were tabulated for the

2021 dataset were also compared using chi-square. Given that term length between the groups was not

“SHO-SME” and “SHO-other organization” groups.

significantly different for SHO and SHO alumni, the groups were combined for the rest of the analysis to
improve study power (see Results).

Section 2: Derailers
Ordinal responses to each derailer question were assigned numeric values 1-4 (4 being “to a great
degree” and 1 being “not at all”), and the mean for each item was calculated, with 2 being the cutoff for
significance. The ranking of mean importance was compared to Boedigheimer et al.’s 2017 ranked
findings. Mean derailer responses were then divided according to the independent variables of tenure
length (<3 or ≥3 years) and appointer type (governor or other appointer) and then compared using chisquare. Comments on section 2’s question matrix and responses to the question about other derailers were
combined and post-coded by two independent reviewers.
One respondent omitted responses for items 4 and 6 in section 2 (see Appendix A). A sensitivity
analysis was conducted, replacing these omissions with “to a great degree” (4) and “not at all” (1)
responses in turn. This analysis did not result in any items being differentially ranked as important (mean
response >2) between the two sensitivity groups. Item 6 (internal leadership) shifted from least important
in rankings when assigned a “not at all” response to third least important when assigned a “to a great
degree” response; its average response value remained <2 in both cases. For convenience in the remainder
of the analysis, the blanks in 4 and 6 were assigned “not at all” responses.
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RESULTS

evenly split into positive- and negative-sentiment responses. From a positive perspective, SHOs

Section 1: Demographics

frequently expressed gratitude for their governors and senior public health staff, with references to

The mean cumulative tenure reported by respondents was 2.26 years among current SHOs
(SD=2.47) and 2.75 years among SHO alumni (SD=2.19), p=0.51. These were consistent with the SHO4

CASE study’s estimate of tenure for current SHOs in 2017: 2.8 years (SD=2.1). Ten SHOs (52.6%) were
appointed by governors, as were six SHO alumni (75%) – a statistically insignificant difference (Table 1).
There was no significant difference in distribution of regional responses between SHOs in 2019 and in
2021 (p=0.74); all regions had a decreased raw response rate from 2019 except New England (Figure 1).
Twelve respondents (44%) were members of their state cabinets.

supportive team environments. On the negative side, there were three examples of being excluded from
conversation or “pushed out” by antagonistic superiors and two examples of failure to coordinate goals
between different levels of government (e.g. local, state, and federal).
The next most common theme was bureaucratic inefficiency, identified in six comments. Specific
examples varied; all comments in this theme were further subcategorized into inefficiencies either within
state government (e.g. unsatisfying systems for hiring, intragovernmental communication, incident
command, etc.) or between state and other levels of government. All comments were negative in
sentiment.

Section 2: Derailers

A theme identified in five comments was funding/staffing. Again, all comments were negative.

Relative Significance of SHO Derailers

Most focused on the under-compensation and overwork of agency staff. All remaining themes were

The relative ranked importance of eight accepted derailers are listed in Figure 2, compared to the
relative importance of similar factors found in Boedigheimer et al.’s pilot study of public health deputies.
SHOs ranked publicity crises, political disinformation, and voluntary staff turnover as the top three
rd

th

th

derailers in 2021. Those were respectively ranked 3 , 6 , and 7 by state health department deputy
directors prior to the pandemic. Lack of political support/confidence/trust from elected officials decreased
during the same period from 1st to 4th most significant; being bypassed by state government leadership
nd

th

also decreased from 2 to 5 .
Staff turnover was ranked as more problematic among SHOs in office <3 years compared to those
in office ≥3 years (p=0.049); 40% of shorter-tenured SHOs reported staff turnover as impacting their
effectiveness “somewhat” or “to a great degree”. Only 16% of SHOs in office ≥3 years said staff turnover
impacted their effectiveness “somewhat” and none said it influenced them “to a great degree.”
In raw data visualization, short-tenured SHOs appeared more likely to respond that publicity

identified in four or less comments. Themes are listed in Table 2 with examples.

SHO-Governor Communication
Fourteen SHO and SHO alumni (51.9%) identified “direct communication” as their primary
means of communicating with the governor (see Methods for definition). Of those thirteen who
communicated indirectly, nearly all communicated through either chiefs of staff, agency directors, or
secretaries of health & human services (four respondents each). Two respondents communicated through
liaison/advisor-type intermediaries.

Section 3: SHO-SME Formal Collaboration
Respondents reported statistically equivalent frequency of most formal collaborative activities
with SMEs compared to 2019 data (Table 3). They did report a decline in the presence of a state health
department board or advisory committee (76.9% in 2019 à 33.3% in 2021; p<0.001). There was also a

crises and public resistance impacted their effectiveness “to a great degree,” but this did not reach

decline in state medical society representation on the state health department board (46.2% in 2019 à

significance in chi-square analysis (p=0.112) (Figure 3). Similarly, based on raw appearance, SHOs

14.8% in 2021; p=0.008).

appointed by governors seemed more polarized than non-gubernatorial appointees about the problem of
being bypassed by their governors, though again results did not reach the threshold for significance
(p=0.064) (Figure 4).

Other SHO Derailers
Following the derailer questionnaire was the open-response question, “Are there other

Sections 4 & 5: SHO-SME & SHO-Other Stakeholder Communication
Of the 23 SHOs who responded to Section 4, nine (39.1%) said they communicated directly with
their SMEs weekly or more frequently. Among the 17 respondents appointed prior to the pandemic, eight
(47%) said their communication with SMEs had increased in frequency compared to prior to the
pandemic. Only one SHO reported communicating less frequently with their SME. Frequency of post-

challenges/circumstances not listed above that have interfered with your ability to carry out your duties as

coded topics of communication focused primarily on COVID-19 mitigation, vaccination, epidemiologic

state health official in the past year?” The top theme post-coded from these responses was

data collection/dissemination, and healthcare capacity needs, as described in Table 4. 14 of 21 SHOs

intragovernmental communication & goal alignment, which was present in nine comments that were

(66.6%) responded that their communications with their SMEs yielded projects, initiatives, or
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deliverables, which were post-coded into the categories of policy development and political allyship
(n=9), coordinated communication (n=8), service coordination for COVID-19 mitigation (n=7), and
stakeholder meetings (n=4) (see Table 5 for examples).
All SHOs who completed Section 5 (n=26) reported communicating with other major
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DISCUSSION
This study does not support the hypothesis of accelerated SHO turnover during the pandemic, but
it does corroborate the SHO-CASE study’s finding of short (<3 year) average tenure among current
SHOs. At an estimated average tenure of 2.26 years based on these most recent results, today’s SHOs do

organizations/nongovernmental stakeholders about their organizational aims in their most recent year of

not have adequate opportunities to develop their professional repertoire as state public health leaders.

service. Of those, 22 (84.6%) reported weekly or more frequent communication with those stakeholders.

Moreover, the brevity of current SHOs’ tenures could hamper their effectiveness at building long-term

Though this appeared to be more frequent than SHO-SME intercommunication, the difference was not

stakeholder relationships, a key responsibility for these “chief health strategists”.10 The following

statistically significant (p=0.235 when dichotomized into weekly/more frequently and monthly/less

discussion will detail how the relative significance of SHO derailers have shifted since the pandemic,

frequently). The primary non-SME stakeholder groups cited were hospital/nursing facility associations

suggesting mitigation strategies for each in turn. Then the discussion will address the pandemic’s impact

(n=25), local and national public health entities (n=14), direct medical service providers (n=9), civic and

on SHO-SME collaboration.

business stakeholders (n=9), and specific medical professional associations (n=7). References to state and
local government entities (other than local health departments) were excluded (n=4) as the question asked
specifically about nongovernmental entities. Post-coded topics of communication overlapped with the
topics discussed with SMEs; frequencies are compared in Table 4. Some responses were too vague to be
categorized into a specific communication topic; both post-coders appreciated prominent
collaborative/intercommunicative themes among this “general feedback” subset.

Public Crisis Management and Messaging
The relative importance of publicity crises and public messaging as SHO derailers increased
following the COVID-19 pandemic. Publicity crises and political disinformation/unscientific legislation,
formerly ranked as the 3rd and 6th most significant derailers, now top the list. Additionally, respondents’
free text responses identified public misinformation and prior intradepartmental crises as major
interferences in their work. This supports the hypothesis that SHOs’ civic visibility during the pandemic
has exposed them to more publicity crises than their predecessors, creating intense pressure that could
lead to turnover.
Identifying how to mitigate publicity crises and disinformation is challenging. As evidenced by
the pandemic news cycle, new publicity threats can evolve quickly. However, crises are promised in a
career in public health. Therefore, crisis management and communication should be cornerstone skills of
state public health leaders. Based on marginal evidence in this study, the authors hypothesize that shorttenured (<3 years) SHOs may have greater difficulty responding to public resistance and crises (Figure 3).
Conversely, past crisis management experience might help longer-tenured SHOs know how to respond to
new challenges.
There is no obvious substitute for this experience among new SHOs. It would do governors well,
then, to seek out SHO appointees with prior experience in crisis management and messaging, since most
SHOs agree these are demanding features of the job. Additionally, newly appointed SHOs should
prioritize crisis management training in the early phases of their service so as not to be caught off-guard
by emergencies, particularly publicity crises.

Management and Personnel Issues
SHOs’ perceived negative impact of voluntary staff turnover also increased dramatically since the
pandemic began, shifting from second-least to third-most significant. Several respondents described this
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issue in the free response section, citing underpayment and underappreciation of staff (“lack of

by the governor, appeared to decrease in relative importance during the pandemic. This is the opposite of

government investment in people”) as major hindrances to their work. Pre-pandemic literature predicted

what the authors anticipated. Moreover, many respondents made unprompted positive comments about

accelerated public health staff turnover for these very reasons.21 Now, the compounding pandemic

how they valued their relationships with their governors and senior staff. Their identification of these two

stresses of poor compensation, long hours, and poor mental health have created a prime environment for

relationships as secrets to success is well-corroborated in the literature. This feedback supports the

public health staffing shortages. The post-pandemic economy introduces an additional pull factor in the

prioritization of good communication and goal alignment between SHOs and governors. It also

form of ample job opportunities in other fields. It is not surprising, then, that understaffing is presenting a

emphasizes the importance of strengthening senior management to strengthen SHOs.

more substantial challenge to SHOs than in the past.
In subgroup analysis, SHOs in office less than 3 years were more likely to identify staffing

Still, these findings should be interpreted with caution, as there is some risk of Hawthorne bias
with internal political issues. For example, respondents might have underreported negative interactions

turnover as a major problem compared to their longer-tenured counterparts. Again, this finding highlights

with their appointers for fear of retribution (despite the survey being anonymous). A close review of the

the importance of practical experience in SHO success. In this case, management experience appears to

data suggests that gubernatorial appointees might have been more split on the impact of being bypassed

be key. Strong management skills would presumably help SHOs know how to deal with personnel issues

by the governor than their non-gubernatorial counterparts, being more likely to list this as interfering with

as well as other derailer themes they identified: team communication and goal alignment, dealing with

their work “to a great degree.” Moreover, a few respondents did share examples of pointed political

bureaucratic inefficiency, and poor funding/staffing (Table 2).

exclusion, though their examples were not published to avoid identification of participants.

Management is not an inborn ability, nor is it typically taught in medical training. Given that only

Overall, appointer type (governor versus another appointing body) appeared to have an equivocal

21.8% of SHOs have management degrees,13 the authors presume that most SHOs learn this skill through

impact on the likelihood of a SHO being bypassed by their governor. Still, a shift away from

experience. However, on-the-job experience is a scarce commodity for SHOs, as is detailed above.

gubernatorial SHO appointment merits further exploration, particularly since state health deputies

The Future of Public Health predicted that management competence would define successful

identified governors’ bypassing behavior as a derailer in the past. Despite its decline in ranking, internal

SHO leadership.7 Feedback collected in this study and other literature suggest that, for SHOs that lack

political conflict may still be a significant derailer for SHOs. Its influence may simply be overshadowed

managerial experience, strong executive leadership teams can provide much-needed support.12

for now by public crises and staffing issues brought to the forefront by the pandemic.

Strengthening the capacity of these teams could help buffer state health departments from rapid SHO
turnover. However, as detailed in the introduction, the institutional knowledge-keepers that constitute
these teams are retiring en masse.14
In summary, personnel shortages will likely remain a problem in state health departments at all
levels until better recruitment and retainment structures are established. From a current governance
perspective, then, states could offer incentives for their senior public health staff to delay retirement,
which would help SHOs and their departments regain their footing after the pandemic.
In the meantime, developing SHOS’ own management repertoire should be a focus of future
efforts. To address the challenge of voluntary staff turnover specifically, ASTHO could develop training
modules on personnel management and team leadership, focused on improving job satisfaction and
managing burn-out among employees. A training on how to petition for personnel funding through the
state government could also be valuable for addressing underpayment – a root cause of staff turnover.21

State Political Conflict
While public-facing crises and staffing shortages appeared to be top-of-mind for respondents, it is
interesting that internal political issues, such as lack of support from elected officials and being bypassed

SHO-SME Collaborative Landscape During the Pandemic
With the previous insights in mind, the discussion will now turn to the topic of pandemic-era
SHO-SME collaboration. Broadly, the results did not support the hypothesis that the pandemic would
increase the frequency of collaborative activities between these groups. Reassuringly, SHOs did engage in
most of the examined activities equally as frequently as in pre-pandemic times. SHOs also reported
communicating with SMEs via phone, email, or in-person as or more frequently than they did prior to the
pandemic – monthly to weekly on average. This was on par with their communication with other key
stakeholders, and their goals of conversation and deliverables were very similar (e.g. information sharing,
service coordination, and policy development). As observed in Scutchfield et al.’s 2019 study, the
subjects of communication between SHOs and SMEs were episodic and specific, in this case focused
largely on pandemic response.1 This capstone supports the observation that SHOs and SMEs leverage
their relationship to address acute problems in their states.1
There were two notable exceptions to the collaborative status quo. First, there were 57% fewer
health department boards and advisory committees reported to be operating in 2021 compared to 2019
(33.3% versus 76.9%). Second, the proportion of state medical society representation within those boards
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decreased 68% (from 46.2% in 2019 to 14.8% in 2021). The reasons for these decreases are unclear. The

Sampling error was also possible in this study. Since ASTHO assumed responsibility for

authors observe that all other activities on the SHO-SME collaborative questionnaire are unlikely to have

identifying and contacting SHO alumni according to the study criteria, the authors themselves did not

a formal legal structure and can therefore occur at the will of a SHO or SME. Conversely, as

verify whether these individuals met inclusion criteria. Alumni were also contacted less frequently than

governmental bodies, state public health boards and their membership are likely more at the mercy of the

current SHOs since their physical mailing addresses were not obtained, which likely also led to their

legislature’s impulses.

underrepresentation. These limitations were accepted in the interest of protecting these individuals’

Though no causal link is established in this study, the authors worry that state health boards and
advisory committees may have been quiet casualties of the anti-public health agenda in state politics. As

privacy.
Small sample size could have limited the accuracy of the results. Although there was no

detailed in the introduction, attitudes in many state legislatures are presently unfriendly toward public

significant variation in regional distribution of responses, it is possible that some of the differences

health, as evidenced by many new bills limiting the power of state public health agencies.25 If state public

between the 2019 and 2021 SHO-SME collaboration results were due to individual variations in normal

health boards and advisory committees had loose or poorly codified legal structure, they could be

state bureaucratic structure. For example, one SHO commented that their state does not have a board of

vulnerable to hostile legislative or regulatory machinations.

health separate from the legislature, nor would they want one.

The implications of losing state boards of health are unfavorable. Prior findings have linked

It is possible that the SHOs who responded in 2019 were from states where boards were and are

strong boards of health (as indicated by SHO appointing power) with longer SHO terms;4 the authors

still active, and the ones who responded in 2021 never had boards at all. Still, the authors believe that the

hypothesize that weak boards of health, then, would destabilize SHOs and their agencies. Furthermore,

results reported here are likely reflective of the true population given that all other components of the

losing these advisory bodies could strand new SHOs with fewer bureaucratic guides, leaving them more

SHO-SME collaboration section were statistically identical to the 2019 results. One respondent requested

vulnerable to the derailers discussed previously.

clarification of the definition of “state health department board/advisory committee,” which should be

From a broader perspective, the dismantling of state boards of health could hint at a larger
political shift away from expert opinion and toward unscientific decision making. This is supported by the

included in any future surveys.
The comparison of these results to the original rankings of Boedigheimer et al.’s SHO derailers is

apparent exclusion of state medical society representatives (presumably proponents of scientific evidence)

limited by the fact that those derailers were originally identified by state health deputies, not SHOs. To

on these boards. To further illuminate this issue, a future project could catalogue the presence and

mitigate this gap, the authors neutrally reworded some derailers to avoid biasing SHO responses.

function of all current state boards of health and advisory committees, determining what legal regulations

However, the authors recognize that SHOs’ perspectives are fundamentally different from state health

or protections exist for these bodies and evaluating the background requirements of their members.

deputies’, with different blind spots and areas of expertise. The shifts in derailer rankings between 2017

STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS

and 2021 should be interpreted with this in mind.

Among this study’s strengths was its use of pre-and post-test data to identify the pandemic’s
impact on SHO collaboration and derailers. The availability of published data on this group has been
limited since the pandemic due to their high workload and limited availability. Therefore, this study
contributes important knowledge about this population’s current activities and challenges.
Like any cross-sectional survey, this one was subject to nonresponse bias. SHOs dealing with a

CONCLUSION
Job turnover remains a major threat to state health department stability at all levels. A strong
executive management team and a good relationship with the governor are protective factors for SHOs,
but neither is guaranteed. General management skills, such as communication, personnel administration,

COVID-19 surge, for example, may have been too busy to respond to the survey, causing the data to

and dealing with bureaucratic inefficiencies appear to be increasingly important for SHOs to avoid the top

portray an overly mild view of the challenges facing the population. To obtain the most complete results

derailers of the pandemic. Crisis management and communication, specifically, are key skills for these

possible, the authors surveyed the entire population, employed an extensive reminder system, and gave a

leaders. Future efforts should focus on strengthening the organizational structures surrounding SHOs,

6-month response window. However, the response rate remained lower than desired.

such as boards of health and senior management teams. Finally, governors and other appointing bodies
should prioritize management (particularly crisis management) credentials among future SHO appointees.
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Despite their challenging circumstances, SHOs exhibited a high degree of stakeholder
engagement during the pandemic with their partners in organized medicine, engaging with them in a
flexible, mutually beneficial manner. This study confirms that the SHO-SME relationship remains useful
for evaluating collaboration between organized medicine and public health. Future work could explore the
qualifications and perspectives of SMEs, about whom less is known.
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TABLES
TABLE 1: Appointer Type by Respondent Group
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TABLE 2: Other Derailer Themes:
Responses to “Are there other challenges/circumstances not listed above that have interfered with your ability to carry out your duties as state
health official in the past year?”
“The Governor and I got along well. He didn't always take my advice and we were sometimes in the dark but had a good
Team Communication & Goal
working relationship.”
Alignment (n=9)
“Experienced discriminatory bias from Governor's appointed COVID-19 Lead”
“State government bureaucracy in hiring and purchasing has delayed progress.”
Dealing with Bureaucratic
“State legislature is demanding of the departments time in non productive ways… or they have public hearings that are
Inefficiency
not a good use of time”
(n=6)
“We had some input, but basically a duel [sic] ICS system”
“Lack of government investment in people -- road blocks to promotion, funding for staff training to keep knowledge, skills,
Poor Funding/
and abilities current.”
Staffing
“State government payment system has hindered ability to reward those workers that have gone 'over-and-above'.”
(n=5)
“Overall lack of funding for the department and for local health departments”
“Misinformation campaigns in the public”
Public Perceptions & Crises
“Former public health crisis leading to criminal charges against current and former officials”
(n=4)
“National schism in approach to COVID has been a major challenge for directing response in my state.”
“Lots of politics for personal motives.”
State Political Conflict
“I see at the national, state and local levels that some elected leaders prefer to hide behind their public health officials,
(n=4)
rather than stand beside them. This is extremely detrimental and politicizes the science rather than politicizing the
politics.”
Professional Transition
“Transition into the position was greatly eased by an outstanding senior staff and Chief of Staff, in particular.”
(n=3)
“My impending retirement created a move to isolate me from decision making.”
Governor
“…our state has been blessed because our Governor is always clear that the policy decisions are his.”
(n=3)
“Strong communications with the Governor.”
Organized Medicine & Public
“Gaps of medical professionals with experience in infectious disease.”
Health
“Surprised by the lack of understanding of public health principles by healthcare providers.”
(n=2)
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TABLE 3: Frequencies of SHO-SME Formal Collaborative Activities According to SHOs, 2019 vs. 2020

2019
"Yes" Freq
(N=39)

Survey Item

1. Does your state medical society have a public health
committee?*
2. Does your state health department have a board or advisory
committee for oversight of its work?
a. Does that board or advisory committee have representative(s) of the state medical society?
3. Does your state medical society have a non-profit
foundation that supports public health projects-research
activities, educational programs related to public health or
community service projects?
4. Does your state medical society routinely include the state
health officer as a speaker at the annual state medical
society meeting?
5. Does the state health department routinely invite the
president or executive director to speak at its major
conferences or meetings?
6. Is the senior medical official in your department of public
health a member of the state medical society?

%

2020
"Yes" Freq
(N=27)

%

p-value

19

48.7%

-

-

-

30

76.9%

9

33.3%

<0.001*

18

46.2%

4

14.8%

0.08*

16

41.0%

10

37.0%

0.744

21

53.8%

13

48.1%

0.649

10

25.6%

5

18.5%

0.497

26

66.7%

16

59.3%

0.539

*2021 results discarded as survey item was incorrectly worded (“medical society” was omitted; see Appendix A for further explanation).
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TABLE 4: Comparison of SHO Communication Topics
COVID-19 Mitigation
(incl. PPE, therapeutic
interventions)

Vaccines
Epidemiology/
Information Sharing

Resource Demand and Allocation

COVID-19 Testing
Public Messaging

Policy Development/
Budget

with SMEs
n=14
“Protocols for quarantine and isolation”
“Needs to implement non-pharmaceutical prevention measures
early in the pandemic.”
“PPE availability”
“Remdesivir”
n=10
“Vaccine allocation”
n=8
“Establishing metrics for ongoing tracking of the pandemic (e.g.,
test positivity rate; new cases per 100,000; compliance with
facemask-use; percentage of fully vaccinated/boosted; etc.)”
“COVID epidemiology”

with Other Stakeholder Groups
n=11
“Quarantine protocols”
“Developing statewide recommendations in line with CDC
guidelines”
“Infection control”
“New therapeutics”
n=12
“Vaccine supply”
n=8
“Develop case-definitions as needed in order to accurately
describe morbidity and mortality related to COVID-19”
“Inpatient capacity”
“public health training”

n=9
“Crisis of Care” / ”Staffing issues”
“Surge capacity”
“recruitment of vaccine providers”
n=4
“CoVID testing”
n=4
“vaccine hesitancy” / “correcting misinformation”
“Information regarding unproven strategies”
“Public communication strategies”
n=5
“legislation”
“social distancing mandates”
“Developing and implementing vaccination requirements for
public employees and universities”

n=7
“Supplemental staffing of medical professionals for
hospitals”
“Access to resources”
n=6
“testing… strategies”
n=1
“improve communications to provide unified sound
messaging”
n=6
“Legislation”
“Budget priorities”
“Healthcare policy issues”
“issue resolution”
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TABLE 5: Deliverables Yielded by SHO-SME Communication
Policy Development/Political Allyship (9)
Developed policies on testing
Political support
Mandating facemask-use indoors for all [omitted] residents and visitors
Recommended quarantine protocols to the Governor
Surveillance protocols
support for medical society resolutions
Mandating Vaccination for all public employees and the [omitted] System of Higher Education
(students, staff and volunteers)
Priority list suggestions
Establishing a statewide goal of having at least 80% of [omitted] residents fully vaccinated by July
1st 2022
Communication (8)
Communications
Communication to providers
Public health messaging on Triple E
Coordinated communication
Article in Society Newsletter
Society Advertising Campaign
physician outreach and education
Media/news conference on Vaccines
Widespread communications distribution
Service Coordination for Vaccination/Testing/Contact Tracing/PPE Distribution (7)
Volunteer clinical corps
Drive thru vaccination clinics
State medical society helped to distribute PPE
Drive thru testing clinics
Pediatric contributions to vaccination efforts
Implemented a statewide contract tracing system
Crisis of Care
Stakeholder Meetings (4)
More frequent interactions with CMOS at hospital and care settings
Weekly infectious disease panel consultations
Statewide regular ECHO meetings
Frequent meetings with key members of his association
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FIGURES
FIGURE 1: ASTHO Region Distribution 2019 vs 2021
(p=0.51)

Gouge 34

FIGURE 2: Derailer Crosswalk
Items that increased in ranking are denoted with red arrows. Those that decreased in ranking have blue arrows.

Note: Grayed-out items were not directly compared. Item 3 from the original rankings was split into items 1 and 8 in new rankings for clearer
delineation of source of conflict. See section development notes in Appendix A for further explanation.
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FIGURE 3: Influence of “Publicity Crises…” by Tenure Length
(p=0.112)

Appendix A: Survey Instrument
COVID-19's Impact on Collaboration and Turnover Among State Health Leadership
Current State Health Official Questionnaire
To ensure your anonymous responses will be included, please complete & return this survey by October 31.
If you have questions about survey, please contact our research coordinator at kaylee.gouge@uky.edu.

Please circle the state or territory in which you currently serve as health official. (REQUIRED)

AL

FIGURE 4: Influence of “Being Bypassed…” by Appointer Type
(p=0.068)
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Your state affiliation is confidential. It will be anonymously coded prior to data analysis and will never be shared
or published.

How many total years have you served in the position
of state health official?

< 1 year
1 to 3 years
3 to 5 years
5 to 9 years
>9 years

Who appointed you to your position for your current
term?

Governor
Cabinet-Level Official/Secretary of Health
Board of Health
Other:

Are you a member of your state's cabinet?

Yes
No

08/22/2021 10:29am
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Section Development Notes
In the past year, how much has each of the following circumstances interfered with your ability
to carry out your duties as state health official?
Not at all

A little

Somewhat

To a great
degree

Visible lack of support,
confidence, or trust from elected
state officials toward you or your
office's activities or
recommendations, with possible
consequences including
exclusion, loss of access, or
punishment.

* Two items were included in Boedigheimer et al.’s list of derailers that were omitted from the list of options: (1) “SHO
disengages (eg, withdraws, shuts down, is indecisive, limited focus, does not respond in an emergency)” and (2) “SHO does
not delegate; functions as a lone wolf; exerts control over everything (micromanages).” Because there was concern that
these items would not be answered truthfully by SHOs, these items were replaced with item 9: “Gaps in personal public
health knowledge and/or experience.” Survey designers felt it represented a more neutral wording that still encapsulated
the shortcomings identified by senior health deputies in 2017.
† These

two items were originally combined as a single item on Boedigheimer’s list of derailers, titled “Agency in Constant
Crisis.” They were subdivided for clarity, as internal leadership conflict was felt to be a separate area of concern from
external conflicts such as publicity crises and stakeholder conflict.

Comments (optional):

Being "bypassed" by the
governor and/or state senior
leadership for public
health advice, expertise, or
decision-making. (e.g. discussing
decisions with your staff instead
of you, making new staff
appointments without your
input, making public statements
on public health issues without
coordination with your office.)

Are there other challenges/circumstances not listed in the previous table that have interfered with your ability to
carry out your duties as state health official in the past year? If so, please describe:

Political disinformation and/or
legislative decisions made
contrary to scientific
recommendations.

In the past year, what has been your primary route of communication with the governor?
Select one option based on the definitions in the box below.
Direct communication
Indirect communication
Other

Publicity crises, including
unflattering media coverage,
conflict with stakeholders, or
public resistance to key public
health messages.†

If Indirect Communication or Other:
What is the title of the person who communicates on your behalf?
_______________________________________________________

Internal leadership conflict,
including tension with the board. †

Direct communication: personally communicating agency needs/perspectives to the governor through meetings,
phone calls, emails, etc.

Loss of credibility/trust among
employees, conflict with labor
unions, or poor agency morale.

Indirect communication: communicating agency needs/perspectives to a cabinet member, gubernatorial assistant,
special appointee, or similar liaison, who then shares those needs/perspectives with the governor on your behalf.

Increases in voluntary staff
turnover.
Gaps in personal public health
knowledge and/or experience.*
Adapted from Boedigheimer S, Yeager V, Chapple-McGruder T, Moffatt S, Halverson P. Public Health Senior Deputy'sPerceptions of
State Health Officials' Success Factors: Professional Characteristics, Personal Attributes, and Signs of Derailment. Journal of Public
Health Management and Practice. 2020;26(1):16-22.

08/22/2021 10:29am
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On average, about how frequently have you directly
communicated with your state medical society’s
executive/CEO since the start of the COVID-19
pandemic?

Check all of the following that are TRUE in your state:

Daily or more frequently
Weekly
Monthly
Quarterly
Annually or less frequently

Direct communication includes phone calls, text
messages, direct emails, meetings, etc.

My state has a public health committee.
This item was intended to read, “My state medical society has a public health committee,” but the
survey contained the ambiguous, erroneous phrasing above. This item was excluded from analysis due
to the wording error.

The senior medical official in my state's health department is a member of the state medical society.
My state's HEALTH DEPARTMENT...

How does this compare to the frequency of your
communication prior to the pandemic?

I was appointed during the pandemic
Higher frequency
Same frequency
Lower frequency

If applicable, list up to 3 of the most common topics of your communication with your state health department's
senior official since January 31, 2020.
1. _____________________________________

routinely invites the state medical society president or executive director to speak at major conferences
or meetings.

2. _____________________________________

3. _____________________________________

has a board or advisory committee that oversees its work.
If yes to above:
That board or advisory committee includes representative(s) of the state medical society.)

Did these communications yield any projects,
initiatives, or other deliverables?

Yes
No

If yes, please list or briefly describe up to 3 examples:

My state's MEDICAL SOCIETY...

1. _________________________________________________________

routinely includes the state health officer as a speaker at the annual state medical society meeting.

2. _________________________________________________________

has a non-profit foundation that supports public health projects (e.g. research activities, educational
programs related to public health, or community service projects).

3. _________________________________________________________

Comments (optional):

(Continued)
08/22/2021 10:29am
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Thank you for taking the time to share your perspective. Your feedback is very valuable to us.
Final results of this study will be distributed to participants no later than May 2022.

Did you communicate with any other major
organizations about your organizational aims in the
past year?

If you would like more information about the background findings supporting this study, we welcome you to refer
to the following articles:
1. Scutchfield F, Howard J, Gouge K, Malone P, Wilson K. Continued Counseling for the Relationship Between
State-Level Medicine and Public Health. Am J Prev Med. 2021;60(3):e131-e138.
2. Boedigheimer S, Yeager V, Chapple-McGruder T, Moffatt S, Halverson P. Public Health Senior Deputy's
Perceptions of State Health Officials' Success Factors: Professional Characteristics, Personal Attributes, and Signs
of Derailment. Journal of Public Health Management and Practice. 2020;26(1):16-22.

Yes
No
Don’t know
If yes, please respond to the final three questions below.
If no or don’t know, please skip the remainder of the survey and return in the provided envelope.
Thank you for your participation!
Who were the top 1-3 most important other organizations or stakeholders with whom you
communicated in the past year?
1. _____________________________________

2. _____________________________________

3. _____________________________________

On average, about how frequently did you communicate with the
above-listed groups in the past year?
Weekly or more frequently
Monthly
Quarterly
Annually or Less Frequently
If applicable, list up to 3 of the most common topics of your communication with these groups in
the past year.
1. _____________________________________

2. _____________________________________

3. _____________________________________

3. Menachemi N, Danielson E, Tilson H, Yeager V, Sellers K, Halverson P. Tenure and Turnover Among State Health
Officials From the SHO-CASE Survey: Correlates and Consequences of Changing Leadership. Journal of Public
Health Management and Practice. 2020;26(1):23-31.

[END OF SURVEY]

Page 43

References
1.
Scutchfield FD, Howard JD, Gouge KR, Malone PD, Wilson KN. Continued Counseling for the
Relationship Between State-Level Medicine and Public Health. American journal of preventive medicine.
2021;60(3):e131-e138. doi:10.1016/j.amepre.2020.09.009
2.
Halverson PK, Yeager VA, Menachemi N, Fraser MR, Freeman LT. Public Health Officials and
COVID-19: Leadership, Politics, and the Pandemic. Journal of public health management and practice.
2021;27 Suppl 1, COVID-19 and Public Health: Looking Back, Moving Forward(1):S11-S13.
doi:10.1097/PHH.0000000000001281
3.
Boedigheimer SF, Yeager VA, Chapple-McGruder T, Moffatt S, Halverson PK. Public Health Senior
Deputy's Perceptions of State Health Officials' Success Factors: Professional Characteristics, Personal
Attributes, and Signs of Derailment. J Public Health Manag Pract. Jan/Feb 2020;26(1):16-22.
doi:10.1097/phh.0000000000000934
4.
Menachemi N, Danielson EC, Tilson HA, Yeager VA, Sellers K, Halverson PK. Tenure and Turnover
Among State Health Officials From the SHO-CASE Survey: Correlates and Consequences of Changing
Leadership. J Public Health Manag Pract. Jan/Feb 2020;26(1):23-31.
doi:10.1097/phh.0000000000000991
5.
Starr P. The social transformation of American medicine. Basic Books; 1982.
6.
Scutchfield FD, Michener JL, Thacker SB. Are We There Yet?: Seizing the Moment to Integrate
Medicine and Public Health. American journal of preventive medicine. 2012;42(6):S97-S102.
doi:10.1016/j.amepre.2012.04.001
7.
Institute of Medicine. The Future of Public Health. National Academy Press; 1988.
8.
Beitsch LM, Brooks RG, Glasser JH, Coble JYD. The medicine and public health initiative ten years
later. American journal of preventive medicine. 2005;29(2):149-153. doi:10.1016/j.amepre.2005.04.005
9.
Davis RM. Marriage Counseling for Medicine and Public Health: Strengthening the Bond
Between These Two Health Sectors. American Journal of Preventive Medicine. 2005;29(2):154-157.
doi:10.1016/j.amepre.2005.04.015
10.
Auerbach J, Fleming D, Goetz T, et al. The High Achieving Governmental Health Department in
2020 as the Community Chief Health Strategist. 2014.
11.
Officials AoSaTH. Data from: ASTHO Profile of State and Territorial Public Health. 2019.
12.
Beitsch LM. SHOing the Way Forward: Mapping a Path for State Public Health CEO Success.
Journal of public health management and practice. 2020;26(1):1-2.
doi:10.1097/PHH.0000000000001084
13.
Yeager VA, Menachemi N, Jacinto CM, Chapple-McGruder T, Danielson EC, Halverson PK. State
Health Officials: Backgrounds and Qualifications. Journal of public health management and practice.
2020;26(1):9-15. doi:10.1097/PHH.0000000000000937
14.
Beitsch LM, Yeager VA, Leider JP, Erwin PC. Mass Exodus of State Health Department Deputies
and Senior Management Threatens Institutional Stability. American journal of public health (1971).
2019;109(5):681-683. doi:10.2105/AJPH.2019.305005
15.
Halverson P, Castrucci BC, Moffatt S, Hancock SE, Boedigheimer SF, Baker EL. State Health
Officials-Defining Success and Identifying Critical Success Factors. Journal of public health management
and practice. 2017;23(2):192-194. doi:10.1097/PHH.0000000000000535
16.
Frieden TR. Ten Things I Wish Someone Had Told Me When I Became a Health Officer. American
journal of public health (1971). 2016;106(7):1214-1218. doi:10.2105/AJPH.2016.303204
17.
Baker EL, Castrucci BC, Moffatt S, et al. What State Health Officials Wish They Had Known and
How They Learned Best. Journal of public health management and practice. 2018;24(1):85-86.
doi:10.1097/PHH.0000000000000695

Page 44

18.
Uma VS, Caron HSJ. The Effects Of Organizational Stability And Leadership Structure On Firm
Performance. Journal of managerial issues. 1998;10(4):469-484.
19.
Ozaralli N. Effects of transformational leadership on empowerment and team effectiveness.
Leadership & organization development journal. 2003;24(6):335-344. doi:10.1108/01437730310494301
20.
Halverson PK, Lumpkin JR, Yeager VA, Castrucci BC, Moffatt S, Tilson H. High Turnover Among
State Health Officials/Public Health Directors: Implications for the Public's Health. Journal of Public
Health Management and Practice. 2017;23(5):537-542. doi:10.1097/phh.0000000000000639
21.
Leider JP, Coronado F, Bogaert K, Sellers K. A Multilevel Workforce Study on Drivers of Turnover
and Training Needs in State Health Departments: Do Leadership and Staff Agree? Journal of public
health management and practice. 2021;27(1):30-37. Research Full Report.
doi:10.1097/PHH.0000000000001082
22.
Baker EL, Boedigheimer SF, Moffatt S, Altman D, Castrucci BC, Halverson PK. Preventing Leader
Derailment-A Strategic Imperative for Public Health Agencies. Journal of public health management and
practice. 2018;24(4):400-403. doi:10.1097/PHH.0000000000000828
23.
Boedigheimer SF, Baker EL. Preventing Health Official Derailment: Detecting Early Warning
Signs-The Role of the Health Agency Senior Deputy Director. Journal of public health management and
practice. 2020;26(3):287-290. doi:10.1097/PHH.0000000000001156
24.
Sellers K, Leider JP, Gollust S, Gendelman M, Castrucci B. Public Health Across Partisan Lines:
What Has Changed Since the Onset of COVID-19. Journal of public health management and practice.
2021;27 Suppl 1, COVID-19 and Public Health: Looking Back, Moving Forward(1):S5-S10.
doi:10.1097/PHH.0000000000001293
25.
Weber L, Barry-Jester AM. Over Half of States Have Rolled Back Public Health Powers in
Pandemic. Kaiser Health News. September 15, 2021. https://khn.org/news/article/over-half-of-stateshave-rolled-back-public-health-powers-in-pandemic
26.
Bryant-Genevier J, Rao CY, Lopes-Cardozo B, et al. Symptoms of Depression, Anxiety, PostTraumatic Stress Disorder, and Suicidal Ideation Among State, Tribal, Local, and Territorial Public Health
Workers During the COVID-19 Pandemic — United States, March–April 2021. Morbidity and Mortality
Weekly Report. 2021;70(26):947-952. doi:10.15585/mmwr.mm7026e1
27.
Mello MM, Greene JA, Sharfstein JM. Attacks on Public Health Officials During COVID-19. JAMA :
the journal of the American Medical Association. 2020;324(8):741-742. doi:10.1001/jama.2020.14423
28.
Vestal C, Ollove M. Politicians Shunt Aside Public Health Officials. June 17, 2020.
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2020/06/18/politicians-shuntaside-public-health-officials
29.
Deliso M. 'Unsafe': Women in public health facing pushback and threats for coronavirus
response. ABC News. July 3, 2020. https://abcnews.go.com/Health/unsafe-women-public-health-facingpushback-threats-coronavirus/story?id=71520262
30.
Walker H. Kent County health officer says he was threatened, nearly run off road over mask
order. Accessed February 14, 2021, 2021.
31.
Ivory D, Baker M. Public health officials in the U.S. need federal protection from abuse and
threats, a national group says. New York Times (Online). 2021 Oct 19
2022-01-09 2021;
32.
Harris PA, Taylor R, Minor BL, et al. The REDCap consortium: Building an international
community of software platform partners. Journal of biomedical informatics. 2019;95:103208-103208.
doi:10.1016/j.jbi.2019.103208
33.
Harris PA, Taylor R, Thielke R, Payne J, Gonzalez N, Conde JG. Research electronic data capture
(REDCap)—A metadata-driven methodology and workflow process for providing translational research
informatics support. Journal of biomedical informatics. 2009;42(2):377-381.
doi:10.1016/j.jbi.2008.08.010

Page 45

34.

IBM SPSS Statistics for Macintosh. Version 27.0. IBM Corp.,; 2020.

